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ABSTRACT 
 
The Nigeria truth commission the Oputa Panel was set up in 1999 to investigate and 
recommend the appropriate redress of human rights violations committed between 1966 and 
1999. Facing several delays and dangers of shut down the Commission finally handed over its 
report in May 2002. The Nigerian government responded by annulling the Commission and 
consequently refused to implement any of its recommendations. This thesis set out to identify 
the factors which can explain the failure of the Nigerian truth commission. We argue that the 
Oputa Panel was never endowed with the sufficient resources and powers to investigate its 
extensive mandate nor did it enjoy the governmental support necessary for the 
implementation of its recommendations which included recommendations of criminal 
investigations into 150 human rights crimes. The outcome can be explained by the invasive 
role of the military in Nigerian politics. Military officers remain a coherent force in Nigerian 
politics. They enjoy the loyalty of the Armed Forces and remain a threat to democratic 
stability. By virtue of their unique positions they have access to political decision-making 
channels and can circumvent any efforts to hold the military accountable for the brutal and 
systematic human rights atrocities which were committed during the military era. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
This is a study of the Nigerian truth commission; The Human Rights Violations Investigation 
Commission, also known as the Oputa Panel where we seek to explain how and why the 
Commission failed. The Commission received an incredibly broad and powerful mandate 
where it was authorised to identify causes and consequences of all gross human right 
violations during the military era between 1966 and 1999 (Yusuf 2007: 271). It was also 
empowered to write a report on its findings including recommendations of measures of 
administrative, judicial or legislative nature which it considered necessary and appropriate to 
address these violations (ibid). In theory this was as very strong commission. In practice 
however the Commission lacked the resources, legal powers as well as appropriate time frame 
to conduct proper investigations and document the systematic abuses of consecutive military 
regimes. The commission nevertheless managed to finish a report which was handed over to 
the Nigerian government in May 2002 only to have its findings invalidated when the 
government's annulled the Commission in January 2003. The report was therefore never 
officially released and none of the Commission's recommendations were implemented.  
 In this paper we set out to identify the factors which we believe can explain the failure 
of the Nigerian truth commission. The paper is structured as follows: In this introductory 
chapter we give a short outline of the political context of the Commission, before we present 
the truth commissions and their role in the field of transitional justice. Lastly we present the 
methodology applied in this thesis. In the second chapter we outline the central variables in 
the theoretical framework which we apply in our analysis of the Nigerian truth commission. 
In the third chapter we utilise the theoretical framework deduced in the theory chapter to 
analyse our case; the Nigerian truth commission, before we in the fourth and last chapter 
summarise and conclude our findings.  
 
1.1. Background 
With its 130 million inhabitants Nigeria is the most populous country on the African 
continent. The state was consolidated by the British in 1914 before it gained its independence 
46 years later in 1960. This geographically diverse region is home to more than 350 
ethnolinguistic groups (Sklar 2004: 39). Although Islam dominates in the North and mostly 
Christians inhabit the South, indigenous religions are also practiced. Ethnic and religious 
cleavages have been a source of conflict since pre-colonial time, but have been greatly 
exacerbated since the military overthrew the government in 1966. The military coup d‟état 
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was initially considered to be a temporary corrective measure to a civilian leadership (Ajayi 
2007). Instead it became the onset of numerous coup‟s and counter coups which 
institutionalised violence as the number one means of transfer of power (ibid: 50). The 
military subordinated the Nigerian constitution to various military decrees and political rights 
and civil liberties were routinely violated (ibid). Some of the eight military administrations 
were extremely repressive and political opponents were frequently incarcerated, tortured and 
even killed. The military, which was largely controlled by Northerners, the Hausa-Fulanis, 
employed a divide and conquer strategy playing ethnic and religious factions against each 
other with disastrous results. Large-scale ethno-communal violence was prevalent during the 
period of military rule, a trend which has continued after Nigeria's return to democracy. More 
than 100.000 people are thought to have been killed in armed communal violence after the 
military era ended (Ebo 2003). At the same time the country is facing major socio-economic 
problems: More than 70 percent of Nigerians live below the poverty line.
1
 The conditions are 
particularly appalling in the Delta River Region in the South. Since natural resources were 
discovered in the region in the 1950s the income generated from oil extraction has become a 
source of personal enrichment for the military elite, whereas the Delta communities have 
suffered from environmental damages from oil spills and gas flares polluting the region. 
Communal protests against the oil companies and the military governments have typically 
been met with harsh crackdowns from the police and security forces.
2
  
 When Nigeria finally returned to democracy in 1999 the country had to come to terms 
with almost 30 years of severe widespread state-sponsored human rights abuses. At the same 
time a culture of violence had manifested itself in the Nigerian society with prevailing high 
levels of inter-religious and ethnic violence threatening the democratic consolidation. The 
president therefore set up the Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission (HRVIC) 
to deal with the human rights violations committed during the military era. The Nigerian truth 
commission was highly anticipated and enjoyed strong support by the general public. The 
Commission received more than 10.000 petitions from Nigerians and held numerous public 
hearings across the country to hear testimonies from victims and families of victims of crimes 
and abuses (Falana 2005). In May 2002, the Commission handed over an eight volume report 
to president Obasanjo which included recommendations of governmental actions and 
appropriate redress of past human rights violations. The report also included propositions for 
                                                 
1
 Nigerian National Planning Commission. “Meeting Everyone‟s Needs. National Empowerment and 
Development Strategy.” Abuja, 2004. 
2
 http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/nigeriabkg1214.htm 
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Security Sector reforms and the restructuring of government institutions. The public release of 
the report and the implementation of its recommendations were however delayed for more 
than six months before the government in a public statement in January 2003 announced the 
annulment of the truth commission. The annulment came after a Supreme Court verdict which 
ruled the investigative powers vested in the Commission to be unconstitutional. Furthermore 
the Supreme Court judged that the power to establish investigative commissions rested with 
the state authorities, not the federal government. As a result the Commission‟s legal powers 
were only authoritative within the Federal Capital Territory. The Nigerian government used 
the verdict to justify the annulment of the Commission and although the decision was met 
with immediate condemnation by the civil society, its decision was largely left unchallenged. 
Consequently the Commission‟s report was never published and its recommendations were 
never implemented. The failure of the Nigerian government to release and implement the 
report is a symptom of the fragile nature of truth commissions. They reflect the political 
circumstances in which they are born in terms of powers and mandate. This is also one of the 
reasons why they are still considered to be a controversial mechanism for transitional justice.  
 
1.2 Transitional justice and truth commissions 
Truth commissions are one of the newest mechanisms of transitional justice.
3
 Transitional 
justice is an area of applied justice referring to a collection of approaches which after a 
transition seek to deal with past human rights violations. It is a multidisciplinary field which 
“encompasses aspects of law, policy, ethics and social science” (Freeman 2006: 4). It 
incorporates not only various measures to establish accountability for human rights breaches, 
but also objectives of truth and reconciliation. The field of transitional justice is unique in the 
sense that it focuses not only on justice for victims of long-lasting abuse from repressive 
regimes and/or militant opposition but is also concerned with peace-building and 
reconciliation. Transitional justice is not a particular form of justice, instead it is moulded by 
the particular context of the society in question. Transitional justice initiatives may take place 
in the immediate aftermath of a transition or sometimes as much as decades later if the 
political circumstances do not allow human rights violations to be addressed at an earlier 
point.
4
 Since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human rights, the approaches to human rights 
abuses have largely fallen into two categories: The first option, criminal prosecutions, have 
                                                 
3
 Ruti Teitel is often credited for coining the term „transitional justice‟ in her seminal work “Transitional Justice” 
from 2000. 
4
 International Centre for Transitional Justice homepage: http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/ 
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been sought in cases where the authoritarian regime is weak and does not constitute a threat to 
the new regime. The second alternative, impunity, has been applied in cases where criminal 
prosecutions were deemed to dangerous and thus a no-action policy would be adopted. The 
transitional justice field was expanded during the 1980s and 1990s when the world saw the 
collapse of authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe and new governments 
sought alternative approaches to dealing with human rights violations. The development was 
largely motivated by the need for a policy which did not endanger the transition but at the 
same time could satisfy the society‟s demand for justice for human rights violations. The 
transitional justice field was therefore expanded and came to include lustration, government 
and Security Sector reforms, reparations to victims, memorialisation initiatives, as well as 
truth commissions.
5
  
 A truth commission is an autonomous, government-sanctioned body established with 
the purpose of investigating past human rights abuses or international human rights law 
violations (Hayner 1994: 604).  These abuses have typically taken place in relatively “recent 
periods of abusive rule or armed conflict” (Freeman 2006: 15).6 They have a “predominantly 
national intrastate focus” (ibid: 14) and assess violations committed within the state (ibid 15-
16).
7 Truth commissions‟ primary function is investigation. Furthermore their investigations 
are victim-centred and their attention “(…) is directed towards the victims' views and 
experiences, meanwhile witnesses and perpetrators are secondary” (ibid: 17). Truth 
commissions also attempt to paint a picture of the overall abuses within a defined period of 
time. Furthermore truth commissions must be endowed with some form of authority which 
allows it to access resources, information and “greater security or protection to dig into 
sensitive issues” (Hayner 1994: 604).8 Finally, truth commissions make recommendations for 
further redress of human rights violations in order to prevent future abuses. 
 Since the first truth commissions were established in the 1980s they have been 
heralded as the future of transitional justice. Today truth commissions have grown in 
popularity and are frequently set up in transitional societies. However, societies in transition 
from authoritarian rule are fragile in the sense that the authoritarian regimes often still wield a 
lot of political power. The new government must therefore avoid a situation where the former 
                                                 
5
 International Centre for Transitional Justice homepage: http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/ 
6
 These periods may or may not have drawn to close; some conflicts are dormant, low-intensity, or fighting 
parties have agreed to a ceasefire. Freeman underscores that truth commissions do not necessarily cover the 
whole of a period of repressive rule (2006). 
7
 These violations constitute “severe acts of violence or repression” (Freeman, 2006: 14). Freeman mentions 
arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearance and summary executions as examples (ibid). 
8
 It is however important to notice that the extent of this authority varies greatly from case to case. 
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regime imposes sanctions which may jeopardise the nascent democratic regime. At the same 
time the new government is typically under pressure from the international community and 
civil society at home to address the human rights violations committed during the 
authoritarian era. In order to meet these demands the government may choose to establish a 
truth commission; a victim-centred, non-adjudicative body which focuses on investigating 
past human rights violations and recording truth narratives, but at the same time does not 
constitute a threat to the former regime. Truth commissions thus represent an 'alternative' 
approach to justice where the intention is to contribute to some form of justice for the victims 
of human rights violations but at the same time avoid actions which may threaten the 
transition. They have the ability to not only identify the magnitude of the human rights 
abuses, and the forces behind the widespread and systematic violations, but also contribute to 
the prevention of recurring abuses. Truth commissions are thus often viewed as a possible 
solution to the dilemma of settling “(…) a past account without upsetting the present 
transition” (O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1995: 57). 
 Truth commissions can sometimes work side by side with common court processes. In 
Argentina, where the first truth commission was set up in 1983, the commission largely 
served as a foundation for later prosecutions of the military regime.
 
Retributive justice and 
reconciliation are however often viewed as antithetical. A non-retributive approach to justice 
is therefore often promoted in transitional societies. The establishment of truth commissions is 
common in societies where the political context does not allow for criminal justice to take 
place. In Chile for example, the truth commission „replaced‟ a judiciary which authority had 
been compromised by the former military regime.  
 
 
1.3 Applied Methodology 
The research design applied in this thesis is a case study research design. The choice of 
methodology was inspired by the desire to learn more about the Nigerian truth commission, a 
commission which has received were little attention from scholars in the field of transitional 
justice. A case study research design was therefore a natural choice allowing an in-depth 
analysis of a single truth commission. The case study is a type of method utilised when the 
objective is “to illuminate a decision or a set of decisions; why they were taken, how they 
were implemented and with what result” (Schramm, 2003: 12). Furthermore a case study 
investigates “(...) a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (...)”, particularly 
when “(...) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (ibid: 
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13). Cases studies are also signified by many independent variables. Moreover it is very 
common to utilise multiple sources of evidence in a triangulating manner. Sources can be 
historical records, archives, databases, documents, interviews etc. An examination of 
historical records, may also include direct observation of the events being studied and 
interviews of persons involved in the events (ibid: 7-8). Although some theorists consequently 
refer to case studies as qualitative case studies, Yin demonstrate that this is not necessary the 
case (2003: 14) Several case studies utilise quantitative as well as qualitative evidence. 
 In the case study analysis the investigator typically engage in pattern matching in 
order to examine the extent to which empirical observations correspond with the theoretical 
propositions, or if rival explanations account for possible diverging patterns. Case study 
research designs vary depending on the objective of the study. This study is a so-called 
explanatory case study. It is a research design where i) the research question is a „why‟ or a 
„how‟ question, ii) the investigator “(…) has little control over events, and iii) the focus is on 
a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin 2003: 1). The objective of 
this type of case study is to give insight to the case in question (ibid). In this type of study the 
case is pre-selected.
9
 Earlier, case studies were not considered appropriate research methods 
to test or describe propositions and instead only applied as a part of a preliminary research 
strategy (Stake 1995) The case study was considered a weaker research method because the 
findings could not be generalised to a whole population in contrast to the statistical method 
(ibid: 8): Yin however maintains that although case studies are not generalisable to 
populations and universes, they are nevertheless generalisable to theoretical propositions 
(ibid:10). The choice of the case study as a research strategy can thus be considered 
appropriate when the goal is “to expand and generalise theories” (ibid: 10) and to make 
analytical, not statistical generalisations (ibid). By identifying causal links and compare the 
details of the case to other cases, these studies can contribute not only to further insight to the 
case in question but also to the development of theory within a particular field.  
 The case study is an all encompassing method which follows the study from start to 
finish: It covers logic of design, data collection techniques and various approaches to analysis 
(ibid: 14). In the section below we present the design of our case study as well as the types of 
data collected and the analytical approach utilised in the study.  
                                                 
9
 Explanatory research designs in contrasts to exploratory case designs are concerned with questions of where 
and what and preoccupied with identifying and sequencing events rather than explaining them. Here, cases are 
not necessarily pre-selected. A third type of design is the descriptive case study or what Stake refers to as an 
instrumental case study where the objective is to contribute to an understanding of general tendencies (Stake 
1995: 4).   
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The Nigerian truth commission was chosen as the unit of analysis of this single case study 
when a general review of the latest work on truth commissions revealed that very little had 
been written about the commission. A part from some brief descriptive outlines of the 
Commission, the Nigerian truth commission has therefore never been the scrutinised in a 
systematic manner. Whereas truth commissions in South America, South Africa and Asia 
have been the focal point of several scholarly works, Hakeem O. Yusuf is the only one who 
has analysed the Commission, its mandate and its report. His analysis is however fairly 
descriptive and does not explain the plausible factors which may have caused the government 
to annul the Commission. Although the Commission received a fair amount of attention 
throughout its operational time and the annulment was condemned and criticised, political 
scientists have yet to conduct an in-depth analysis of the Commission. We suspect that this 
might be explained by the simple fact that less successful truth commissions typically do not 
receive the same amount of attention as successful ones. We thus formulated a research 
question which asked the question; Why did the Nigerian truth commission fail?   
 In order to answer our research question we had to develop a theoretical framework 
which could be applied in our analysis. First we had to arrive at an understanding of what 
constitutes a failed or a successful truth commission respectively. Furthermore we had to 
investigate what causes a truth commission to fail. What are the central variables which will 
have the decisive effect upon its outcome? In order to identify these explanatory variables we 
utilised the vast array of transitional justice literature to develop several theoretical 
propositions against which our case, the Nigerian truth commission, was tested. The literature 
on truth commissions typically test theoretical propositions on empirical observations in 
single case studies and small N studies. A majority of these empirical studies have been made 
on truth commissions in South America. This is not surprising considering that a majority of 
the more than twenty truth commissions have been set up here. The Latin American context 
of course differs from that of the African. Nevertheless, the cases still have in common the 
fact that most of them are set up during times of transition, either from war or from 
authoritarian regimes. This type of context define and delimit the options for human rights 
policies and the limiting or enabling factors are typically recognised in cases across 
continents. In the analysis of the truth commission, scholarly literature on the development of 
human rights in Nigeria was utilised. Email correspondence with Nigerian scholars provided 
important newspaper articles related to the Nigerian truth commission. In particular Hakeem 
Yusuf at the School of Law, University of Glasgow provided the latest articles and 
information on the Nigerian truth commission. Historical works and political analyses of the 
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authoritarian regimes were also utilised. In the analysis we relied mainly on secondary 
sources. Several attempts to contact Nigerian human rights organisations and networks by 
phone and email proved unsuccessful. Likewise email and phone interviews to key persons in 
the Nigerian human rights community were prepared, but several attempts of contact did not 
yield any results. Although we suffered from a lack primary sources on the truth commission 
itself, there is a considerable range of literature on the Nigeria's last transition period which 
proved invaluable in the testing of our hypotheses.  
 In the final chapter of this thesis we summarised our findings based on our analysis of 
why the Nigerian truth commission failed. Considering the fact that transitional justice is still 
a field in development the conclusions made in this thesis are inevitably tentative in their 
nature. Secondly, the modest amount of empirical data available did not allow us to make any 
finite conclusions. In that respect this case study offers a plausible, rather than a final answer 
to the research question, but at the same time the study can hopefully contribute to the 
understanding of what makes truth commissions fail as well as the critical discourse on truth 
commissions and their role as transitional justice tools.  
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2.0 OUTLINING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE 
NIGERIAN TRUTH COMMISSION. 
 
What does it take for a commission to be deemed successful? Against which criteria should a 
truth commission be judged? The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission has 
often been heralded as the most successful commission in history. Similarly the Argentine 
Commission on the Disappearance of Persons has been regarded as a successful truth 
commission although its mandate was very different to that of the South African truth 
commission. Do these truth commissions, which are often viewed as model truth 
commissions, exhibit features which can be recognised in other truth commissions? We will 
try to answer these questions by reviewing the latest literature on truth commissions. The 
purpose of this exercise is to develop a set of criteria against which the Nigerian truth 
commission can be tested in order to determine the extent to which this commission failed. 
We recognise that the development of a theoretical framework consisting of a range of 
'success criteria' will ultimately be normatively charged. Some scholars will argue that truth 
commissions which are able to complete their report can be considered successful. Others 
argue that truth commission can only be judged as successful as long as they also contribute 
towards accountability for human rights violations. In this thesis our arguments tend towards 
the latter. We agree with Stanley Cohen who argues that considering the fact that truth 
commissions are tools of transitional justice, principles of truth and accountability must 
govern their work (1995). At the same time the field of transitional justice is unique in the 
sense that it focuses not only on justice for victims of long-lasting abuse from repressive 
regimes and/or militant opposition but also incorporates the objectives of peace-building and 
reconciliation. Although the concepts of truth, justice and reconciliation are sometimes 
viewed as contradictory, truth commissions are often heralded as the transitional justice tool 
which best can consolidate these goals. We thus include the attempt to pursue reconciliation 
as the last success criterion in this theoretical framework. These criteria are further developed 
in point 2.1.   
 In the second part of this chapter we develop the framework of central independent 
variables which are considered to have a determining influence on the success of truth 
commissions: Truth commissions typically operate under volatile political circumstances and 
their work will be influenced by actors which have something at stake in a policy on human 
rights. We thus aim to identify how the political context defines and delimit the outcome of 
truth commissions. This topic further developed in section 2.2. A truth commission however 
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is not only influenced by political factors; the amount of time, legal powers and resources 
which is included in the mandate will influence the Commission's chance of fulfilling its 
duties. Some commissions are blessed with strong mandates where large budgets and a wide 
range of powers are guaranteed. Others commissions again are endowed with modest powers 
and resources. Some commissions are only obligated to investigate severe cases of human 
rights violations whereas others investigate a range of violations over a very long time span. 
We often observe that in societies where the outlook for transitional justice is meagre, a truth 
commission will be weaker and typically exhibit fewer powers and resources than in a society 
where there are no adverse risks associated with a proactive policy on human rights. Here a 
truth commission will typically enjoy a stronger mandate. In order to understand what 
influences a commission's subsequent success or failure in fulfilling its objectives we 
therefore need to identify the factors which can explain this variation. We devote section 2.2 
Establishment of the Commission and its Mandate to this endeavour. 
 
 
2.1 The Dependent variable - What Constitutes A 'Successful' Truth Commission?  
When truth commissions first emerged a lot of attention was devoted to how these transitional 
justice tools should be evaluated. Some argued that truth commission should be considered 
successful insofar they fulfilled the duties assigned to them (Brahm 2007: 17). As Chapman 
and Ball in Brahm (2007) emphasise the great variation in investigative mandates and 
political circumstances justifies a judgement of a truth commission on its own terms, not in 
comparison to its counterparts. Brahm therefore concludes that truth commissions which 
accomplish the objectives stated in the mandate could be viewed as successful (2007: 17). 
Although each mandate is uniquely tied to its political context, there are some general 
principles which are common to most of them. Firstly, a mandate will ask the commission to 
investigate, within some given parameters, a range of human rights violations which occurred 
during a finite period of time. Secondly, the commission will be asked to present its findings 
in a report which will be handed over to the government when the commission's work has 
come to an end. The report typically involves recommendations for further government 
actions in addressing human rights violations. These recommendations may or may not be 
mandatory. The investigations and writing of a truth report are thus considered the main 
activities of a truth commission. In section 2.1.1 we will further examine what these activities 
entail and determine what would be considered a successful truth commission in this regard. 
 As Brahm infers, the completion of a mandate is a great achievement in itself (2007). 
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However if we assume that truth commissions should contribute towards justice as well as 
truth, this success criterion appears inadequate. Truth commissions are not adjudicative bodies 
and unlike courts they cannot dispense justice, however their reports typically include 
recommendations of both criminal and non-retributive justice initiatives. In order for these 
recommendations to have an impact, a truth commission is dependent on the support and 
acknowledgement of the government. It follows that if the effect of a commission should 
work should go beyond the simple production of a truth report, the government must accept 
and implement the commission's recommendations. In section 2.1.2 we further develop what 
the implementations of recommendations entail for the success of a truth commission. 
The last success criterion which will be evaluated in this thesis is the degree to which a 
truth commission has contributed towards reconciliation. Truth commissions are becoming 
increasingly popular in countries fractured by civil war and internal conflicts of communal, 
ethnic and/or religious nature. These conflicts often prevail even after the countries have 
returned to democracy. In these societies the need to reconcile political opponents and 
fighting communities is vital to secure the survival of a nascent democracy and truth 
commissions are often considered the best tool for securing peace and reconciliation. Still, the 
path(s) to reconciliation and if truth commissions can actually contribute to reconciliation is 
disputed. The indicators of reconciliation are also debated. Furthermore if these indicators 
change after a truth commission has been established, to what extent can the changes be 
ascribed to the commission and not to other aspects of the society such as culture and political 
institutions? Also if we do not observe measurable change, to what extent do we know 
circumstances would not have worsened in the absence of a truth commission? These are a 
few of the dilemmas which need to be resolved before a theory on truth commissions and 
reconciliation can develop.  
Few would contests that reconciliation is a good thing and that pursuing this goal 
should in general be acclaimed. However since the relationship between truth commissions 
and reconciliation is not fully understood this part of the framework will be tentative in its 
nature and limited to whether the commission actively pursued reconciliation in its work. The 
pursuit of reconciliation as a measure of success is further developed in section 2.1.3.     
 
2.1.1 Fulfilment of the objectives stated in the mandate - Investigations and writing of a 
truth report 
Truth commissions are first and foremost investigative bodies. Their prior objective is to 
clarify human rights violations that occurred in the past, something which is particularly 
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important in societies where the magnitude of the violations is not known to the general 
public. As Daly and Sarkin point out “(…) most oppressive regimes are characterised not only 
by their brutality, but also by a code of silence that enshrouds policies of violence and 
methods of control” (2006: 141). During these circumstances truth commissions typically 
have to engage in time- and resource consuming investigations in order to identify and 
establish the causes and consequences of the violations. In societies where the truth about 
human rights violations is widely known to the public, Hayner argues that a truth 
commission‟s report is more important with respect to acknowledging past events rather than 
finding the truth (1998: 204). This was the case in South Africa where many of the violations 
of the apartheid regime were widely known to the public and the comprehensiveness of the 
TRC‟s report made it impossible to both deny and justify the abuses that took place during the 
apartheid regime (Leman-Langlois and Shearing 2004: 229-230).  
 A truth commission‟s report is often considered a superior accounting of the past 
because of its ability to integrate several perspectives. Unlike court trials, truth commissions 
have a more comprehensive understanding of the concept truth and often incorporate various 
types of „truths‟ in their report. 10 In contrast to the rudimentary perception of truth which 
dominates the court system where the findings are limited to identifying the crime and the 
wrongdoers, truth commissions take into account the underlying structural causes and 
consequences of mass atrocities and contribute to the “understanding of institutional failings 
that allowed the crimes to occur” (Brahm 2007: 21). Truth commissions are also known to be 
victim-centred bodies which mean that they emphasise what is known as narrative truths. 
Narrative truths are the victims‟ own testimonies of abuses and the receiving and recording of 
these statements constitute a major part of a commission‟s work. The statements represent the 
victims' subjective experiences of the events and may not be equated with scientific truths; 
however they can be instrumental in revealing underlying structural causes of mass 
atrocities.
11
 In Chile for instance the Rettig Commission used information from individual 
cases to demonstrate “how each act of violence formed part of a conscious and deliberate 
policy to eliminate opponents of the Pinochet regime” (Gairdner 1999: 29).  
Unlike other historical documents, a truth commission‟s report can have unique 
                                                 
10
 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission identified several types of truths which it attempted 
to integrate in its report: narrative, historical, forensic and social truth (Daly and Sarkin 2007: 148). 
11
 It is important to recognise that even if mechanisms such as truth commissions are employed by the state and 
„everybody‟ is invited to contribute this truth is ultimately a „partial truth‟ (Stanley 2005: 589); it is for example 
very common that women who are victims of violence do not come forward, and that the official truth ultimately 
is gender-biased (Stanley 2005: 589-590). This is particularly true in cases of sexual violence which are often 
considered a taboo and as a consequence rarely vocalised (Daly and Sarkin 2007: 144). 
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preventative functions. Truth commissions unearth abuses and conflicts as well as the 
underlying structural causes and can therefore recommend the appropriate measures in order 
to prevent future recurrence. Furthermore the truth report may serve as an instrument of 
accountability particularly in societies where trials are not feasible. This accountability 
function is stronger when truth commissions are authorised to identify individual 
responsibility for crimes and name names of alleged perpetrators in their reports. The notion 
behind this „truth as justice‟ mechanism is that even though perpetrators for various reasons 
cannot be persecuted, truth commissions can expose the crimes and those responsible to the 
public (Daly and Sarkin 2007: 143). The punishment is “(…) not the classic model of 
incarceration (…), rather, punishment is of a moral dimension, entailing shame, opprobrium, 
and disgrace” (Daly 2001: 135). This type of accountability is often viewed as a milder form 
of retributive justice and often referred to as „naming and shaming.‟ Naming of alleged 
perpetrators is controversial because it is not considered to be according to due process 
(Cassel 1995: 329). However, in cases where commissions have named names, this is 
commonly done according to some pre-established criteria where reliable evidence must be 
presented.
12
 The „truth as a justice‟ mechanism was emphasised by the truth commissions in 
Chile and El Salvador which both had the powers to name names in their reports (Gloppen 
2005: 37). However as Daly and Sarkin observe public shaming “presupposes a moral 
reference group that most perpetrators avoid by isolating themselves happily in their own 
ethno-racial enclave with similar beliefs” (2007: 143). Consequently this form of 
accountability will have few or no consequences for perpetrators who either flee the country 
or live relatively isolated from the rest of the population. Shaming by naming names is also 
limited by the fact that perpetrators may remain indifferent to public condemnation and even 
defend criminal actions in the face of public scrutiny.  
We thus conclude that a successful truth commission is one which conducts thorough 
investigations of the range of violations identified in the mandate. This involves indentifying 
not only which crimes were committed but also why they were committed. A successful truth 
commission also identifies causes and consequences of widespread abuses and focus on the 
victims‟ experiences by including narrative truths in its report. A report may include names of 
alleged perpetrators (if reliable evidence is available) and thus contribute towards some form 
of accountability. This can be particularly important in societies where the court system is 
                                                 
12
 For example the Salvadoran truth commission was mandated to name names of alleged perpetrators when 
reliable evidence was available (Salvadoran truth commission Report; From Madness to Hope: The 12 Year War 
in El Salvador http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/el_salvador/tc_es_03151993_mandate.html). 
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rendered inoperable. 
 
2.1.2 Implementation of recommendations 
As we established in the last section truth commissions are non-adjudicative bodies and 
typically do not have the powers to sanction or prosecute. Thus when a commission finishes 
its report further address of the violations indentified here is at the hands of the government. 
An affirmative government will actively pursue the implementation of a commission's 
recommendations. Less supportive governments on the other hand have been known to reject 
the commission‟s findings altogether and even refuse to release the report. Most governments 
do however publish the reports but with few implications beyond moral condemnation of the 
abuses depicted by the commission.  
 Some truth commissions include recommendations for prosecutions in their report and 
sometimes their findings serve as preliminary foundation for later criminal investigations. If 
the political circumstances allow for prosecutions to take place, the findings of the 
commission can be handed over to the Prosecutor‟s Office and legal proceedings may be 
pursued. Should truth commissions recommend criminal sanctions and should contribution 
towards criminal justice be a criterion for a successful truth commission? Many theorists 
would respond positively to this question. They would argue a strong case for a criminal 
justice response to past human rights violations based on international law. Walsh contends 
that “(...) regardless of who leads the government, the state has a duty under international law 
to compensate victims for breaches of state obligations” (1999: 43). An extension of this 
argument emphasises a state's obligation to prosecute past violations (Mendez 1997: 259; 
Pasqualucci 1994: 29-330; Roht-Arriaza, 1990: 449).
13
 This is also the view of Freeman who 
claim that states have the responsibility to “investigate, prosecute, and punish serious human 
rights violations (...), to identify victims and perpetrators, and to offer some form of 
compensation to the victims as well as guarantees of non-repetition” (2006: 6). Some theorists 
thus argue that truth commission should only be judged successful insofar their findings and 
recommendations lead to criminal investigations. As Aukerman observes, prosecutions help 
to establish the rule of law and reinforces “moral norms and contribute to shared 
understanding that certain behaviour is wrong” (2002: 72-73). In this respect truth 
commissions are useful only to the extent that they actually contribute to future prosecutions 
(Brody 2001).    
                                                 
13
 This argument is further developed by Othman 2005: 249-253 and by Hall 2003: 47-72. 
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Many theorists would however contest the claim that only truth commission which lead to 
prosecutions should be deemed successful, particularly those that favour a non-retributive 
approach to human rights violations (Minow 1998; Villa-Vicencio; 2000; McEvoy 2007). 
Government reforms, lustration, compensations to victims, memorialisation initiatives are 
examples of non-retributive approaches to human rights violations and these are often a part 
of a truth commission‟s recommendations. Even though non-retributive forms of justice do 
not lead to incarceration, non-retributive sanctions can have serious implications for 
perpetrators, such as the loss of positions and respect in society. They are also arguably easier 
to enforce than criminal sanctions. Non-retributive sanctions are in Villa-Vicencio‟s words a 
“more realistic way” of preventing future human rights abuses (2000: 208). Moreover many 
societies in transition lack the sufficient judicial infrastructure and suffer from inadequate 
institutional capacity rendering the court system unable to deal with the type and magnitude 
of violations which are committed in repressive regimes (Othman, 2005: 264). In a 
transitional society the judiciary is often compromised by the authoritarian regime. The 
judiciary may comprise of corrupt judges and officers with dubious connections to the former 
regime. It is therefore not uncommon to observe violations of the requirements of legal justice 
on a routine basis (Elster 2004: 86-88). Another strong argument against a retributive 
approach is that the respective violations are of such magnitude that the judiciary will fail to 
“(…) prosecute all equally culpable individuals (…)” (Aukerman 2002: 61). This is a 
violation of the principle which states that crimes of like nature must be treated alike (ibid). 
This principle is “further undermined when prosecutions target lower-level offenders while 
ignoring more blameworthy ones (...)” (ibid). 
 The latter argument presented above would justify a truth commission which strictly 
adheres to non-retributive principles, particularly if the commission operates during volatile 
political circumstances where criminal sanctions could become a destabilising factor. The 
problem is that if securing the transition as a political project becomes the superior goal of the 
truth commission, they cannot be considered appropriate tools of transitional justice. 
Although most transitional justice scholars do agree that truth commissions have “the 
potential to support transitions from authoritarian to democratic governance” (Brahm 2007: 
25),
14
 some scholars believe that non-retributive transitional justice strategies are often 
promoted, not because of their moral superiority but because the political profits which can be 
reaped from this approach (Wilson 2001). Transitional justice should enforce the rule of law 
                                                 
14
 See also Gairdner, 1999: 3; Minow 1998; Teitel 2000; Freeman and Hayner 2003; Quinn 2003.  
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and since human rights atrocities are not unlike any other crimes, they should be treated 
accordingly. This view is also strongly supported by legal arguments derived from 
international law. As Aukerman observes, non-retributive mechanisms of transitional justice 
are “simply not proportional to the crimes committed by human rights violators” (2002: 58). 
We recognise that the political context defines and delimits the extent to which truth 
commissions can contribute towards accountability (particularly in the short run), nevertheless 
we will regard truth commissions which contribute towards criminal justice as more 
successful than cases where only non-retributive measures are implemented.  
 
2.1.3 Pursuit of Reconciliation 
Truth commissions have often been heralded as superior instruments for achieving 
reconciliation as opposed to other tools of transitional justice such as trials and prosecutions. 
Reconciliation has thus become an integrated part of many transitional justice initiatives the 
last two decades and is even incorporated in the name of some truth commissions (such as the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Sierra Leonean Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission). This is largely due to truth commissions‟ emphasis on non-
retributive approaches to human rights violations as well as specific activities of the 
commission which are considered by to be guided by reconciliatory principles.  
What does the concept reconciliation entail? The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
the verb „to reconcile‟ to mean “to bring a person again into friendly relations after an 
estrangement (…). To bring back into concord, to reunite (persons or things) in harmony” 
(Hayner 2001: 154). It is thus a process which entails mutual efforts and responses by relevant 
parties in order to mend a broken relationship. In a transitional justice context this would 
necessarily involve the process of reconciling political enemies and combatants on opposite 
sides in what have often been prolonged war-like conflicts. The concept however does not 
readily translate to transitional societies, particularly because the restoration of „friendly 
relations‟ and the pursuit of „harmony‟ would also involve reconciling victims and 
perpetrators where perpetrators are often responsible for prolonged, deliberate and grave 
human rights violations involving torture, abductions, and murder.
15
 In most societies this is 
                                                 
15
 This dilemma exemplifies how reconciliation is a contested concept, not only in substance, but also whether it 
should be pursued at all. Is reconciliation beyond a simple agreement to abstain from the use of violence 
something worth striving for? Is it fair to ask victims to agree on some form of relationship with their abusers? 
Furthermore, critics of truth commissions as instruments of reconciliation question whether reconciliation can be 
sanctioned by an authoritative body: Truth commissions‟ reconciliatory initiatives might lead to a situation 
where victims feel pressurised into accepting the apology and to forgive the abuser (Burgess, 2007: 194). 
Reconciliatory efforts may be especially provoking if they do not seem to have an effect on sustainable peace. 
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just not a realistic scenario. Crocker has developed a more practical understanding of the 
concept which is applicable to a transitional justice context. He depicts reconciliation as a 
layered concept where the „thin‟ version of reconciliation relates to a simple agreement 
between former enemies to live together and use other means than violence to resolve 
conflicts, also referred to as political reconciliation.
16
 In a „thicker‟ version of reconciliation 
we enter a space were former enemies not only agree to live together in peace, but also 
interact in areas of common concern with mutual respect for each other. An even thicker 
version of reconciliation would involve a process of mutual forgiveness and healing (2000: 
108). This type of reconciliation may take place on individual and communal as well as elite 
levels (Gloppen 2002: 6).  
 The road to reconciliation outlined above is just one of several plausible paths to 
reconciliation. Some theorists however argue that truth commissions may not be the best way 
to achieve reconciliation. They argue that impunity and oblivion can serve purposes of peace 
and stability. As Minow observes truth commissions can also give produce “too much 
memory” (cited in Hayner 2001: 241). Particularly when justice is unattainable 'too much' 
truth may cause people “(...) to clamor for justice, and its absence is likely to impede 
reconciliation” (Daly and Sarkin 2006: 140: Stanley 2005: 583). Other theorists again argue 
that a retributive justice is a better way to achieve reconciliation. It represents the clearest 
break with the past; It is the proof that “we are not like them” (Vaclav Havel cited in 
Aukerman 2002: 49). Retributive justice can contribute to reconciliation by “restoring human 
dignity by levelling the playing field after the perpetrator‟s mastery of the victim (...)” 
(Wilson 2001: 546). Furthermore retributive justice “can help by affirming to the victim that 
his suffering counts enough for the rest of the community to do something about it (…)” 
(ibid). It is “(...) a message to the community of equal dignity and worth of all persons” 
(Hampton 2001: 536): In fact Wilson argues that true forgiveness and reconciliation may only 
be possible once retribution has been exacted (Wilson 2001: 545). Wilson further notes that 
many oppose retributive justice as a path to reconciliation because they mistake retributive 
justice for a quest for revenge, but at the same time it is important to note that in some 
societies reconciliation beyond a simple agreement to co-exist may not be plausible (ibid: 
                                                                                                                                                        
There is also the danger those severe human rights abuses are downgraded to be about conflictual relationships 
instead of being treating as criminal acts. This is also the view of Wilson who argues that face-to-face meetings 
between victims and perpetrators where the perpetrator can apologise and offer some sort of restitution to the 
victim reduces a violation of “moral and legal imperatives (…)” (2001: 552) to a conflict that needs to be 
resolved. 
16
 Political reconciliation is a type of reconciliation “(…) where former enemies agree to use non-violent means 
to resolve conflicts” (Gloppen, 2002: 1). 
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538). In this framework we will not try to resolve the issue of which is the best approach to 
reconciliation. Instead we will investigate how truth commissions intend to pursue 
reconciliation through public hearings and the production of a truth record and further 
critically review how these activities may be considered reconciliatory.  
 
 
2.2 The Independent Variables - What Factors Influence The Success of a Truth Commission? 
In the last section we established three criteria against which the success of a truth 
commission will be measured:
17
 
 
1. Fulfilment of the objectives stated in the mandate 
2. Implementation of recommendations 
3. Pursuit of reconciliation 
 
However which factors influence the success of a truth commission? The first criterion, the 
commission's ability to fulfil the objectives stated in the mandate, is typically related to 
aspects of the mandate itself: The funding, legal powers and the time determine how 
meticulous and thorough the investigations and the commission‟s report will be. A 
comparison of truth commissions show that these parameters vary greatly across cases. For 
instance the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) enjoyed a budget of 
18 million USD per annum whereas Chadian commission was so poorly funded it had to 
relocate to a detention centre (Brahm 2007: 30). The Sierra Leonean truth commission 
enjoyed a range of legal powers whereas the Guatemalan commission had restricted search 
and seizure powers. The South African TRC lasted from 1995 to 2000 whereas the 
Salvadoran Commission only was given six months to finish its work.  
 This variation is not surprising considering that the investigative periods span from a 
few years to several decades and the range and magnitude of violations under investigations 
vary. However when controlled for these factors, there is still a significant difference in the 
powers and resources enjoyed by the commissions: For instance both the South African and 
                                                 
17
 Apart from the last phase, Pursuit of Reconciliation (which takes place throughout the duration of a 
commission‟s work), The criteria developed in this framework are really phases of a truth commission‟s work 
which take place in a chronological order: Each phase presupposes the former. Stage two; the Implementation of 
Recommendations takes place only after the commission has investigated human rights violations, written and 
handed over its report. Stage one; the investigating and writing of a report, presupposes the Establishment of the 
Commission. The Establishment of the Commission is a preliminary phase where the strength of the mandate is 
determined.  
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the Chadian truth commission had very broad mandates in terms of the range of violations to 
investigate. But the Chadian truth commission only had a fraction of the budget of the South 
African TRC. This variation in powers, time and resources are indicators of the strength of a 
commission and is largely explained by the political circumstances in which a commission is 
born. How strong a commission will be is ultimately determined by the struggle between the 
forces which have something to lose or gain from the establishment of such a commission. As 
a consequence of this struggle some commissions will receive very strong mandates with 
extensive legal powers whereas others will have few powers allowing the commissions only 
to conduct superficial investigations. 
Which factors determine whether or not a truth commission is established and how 
strong its mandate will be? Truth commissions with weak mandates are often observed in 
societies where the authoritarian regime still wields a lot of influence on the political scene. 
This is not surprising considering that the authoritarian regime is the main specimen under the 
truth commission‟s investigative lens. The authoritarian regime is typically responsible for a 
majority of human rights breaches committed in the past and will try to undermine any efforts 
to address these violations. If the authoritarian regime enjoys the loyalty of the military and 
effectively constitutes a destabilising force in the nascent democracy, the new government 
will be unwilling to establish a commission at all. Consequently if the authoritarian regime is 
weak and does not constitute a threat to the new regime, the government is arguably more 
willing to authorise a commission with a strong mandate. Furthermore a new government is 
often under pressure from both international and domestic human rights actors to adopt a 
proactive stance on human rights. A new government has to prove that it is genuinely 
committed to the democratic project and the protection of human rights in order to achieve 
international legitimacy. In this respect the establishment of a strong commission can be a 
viable strategy to achieve this objective and further strengthen its legitimacy both on the 
domestic and international scene. Thus, we will firstly investigate how the political factors 
outlined above; the new government, the authoritarian regime and the human rights 
community influence the establishment of a truth commission and the strength of its mandate 
in the section Establishment of the Commission and its Mandate. We will treat the variables 
the new government and the authoritarian regime together throughout this framework because 
it is the relative strength between them that is considered to define and delimit the scope of 
human rights policies in a new democracy. In the section Fulfilment of the Objectives Stated 
in the Mandate we will turn our attention to how the particular aspects of the mandate, the 
legal powers, the monetary resources and the time available to the commission affect our first 
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success criterion; the fulfilment of duties assigned to the commission.  
 Our second criterion for success is the implementation of a commission's 
recommendations. Which factors influence the implementation of these recommendations? 
Most truth commissions operate during politically volatile circumstances in the wake of 
transitions from authoritarian rule, or after a civil war, when human rights are sensitive issues. 
Several actors with opposing agendas will therefore have a stake in the implementation of the 
commission‟s recommendations and the development of a policy on human rights. The new 
government on one hand is concerned with legitimising itself in order to secure the survival of 
the regime. Enforcing criminal accountability for human rights violations may be instrumental 
in increasing the government‟s popularity and secure the survival in future elections. The 
former regime on the other hand is invariably concerned with avoiding accountability for 
human rights crimes and will try to evade any form of sanctions, loss of reputation, positions, 
or at worst the loss of freedom or life. At the same time the new government may be under 
pressure from domestic human rights organisations and the international community to hold 
human rights violators accountable. If the human rights community is able to maintain a 
consistent pressure the government may be compelled to enforce criminal accountability for 
human rights violations. This strategy can serve to increase the legitimacy of the new regime 
and secure its survival in future elections. However if a truth commission energises calls for 
stronger accountability measures, the military may be compelled to take action against the 
new regime. In these scenarios, the government may preclude any prosecution attempts by 
granting amnesties to alleged perpetrators or strictly adhere to non-retributive policies.  
 When on the other hand political circumstances are conducive to criminal sanctions, 
truth commissions sometimes serve as a preliminary exercise for later prosecutions. Here the 
truth commission is authorised to recommend legal proceedings in cases where this is 
considered appropriate and its findings are typically handed over to the Prosecutors‟ office. 
The opportunities for legal proceedings however depend as much on the state of the legal 
system as they do on the political climate. In some societies the judiciary has remerged 
relatively unscathed from authoritarian rule whereas in others the judiciary is plagued with 
corrupt judges and inadequate infrastructure. Thus without a functioning judiciary the big fish 
are much more likely to avoid prosecutions (although these may take place long after the 
return to democracy).
18
 The role of the judiciary will be further investigated in the section 
Implementation of the Mandate. Here we also examine how the new government and the 
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 Crimes against humanity as defined in the International Military Tribunal, Nurnberg, of 8 August 1945 do not 
have a statute of limitations (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_limit.htm) 
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authoritarian regime as well as the human rights community, as outlined above, influence the 
implementation of the recommendations.  
Lastly, in section 2.2.9 Pursuit of Reconciliation, we will examine the reconciliatory 
elements of a truth commission‟s work. Reconciliation is by many scholars considered an 
important and necessary step towards democratic consolidation. Still, how and to what extent 
truth commissions can contribute towards reconciliation is disputed in the literature. Some 
commissions, such as the South African TRC explicitly set out to write a report which would 
serve as a foundation for future peace-building and reconciliation. Some truth commissions 
also hold public hearings which are often an attempt to reconcile victims and perpetrators and 
former political opponents (such as for instance the South African TRC, The Timor Leste 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation and Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission). Thus in this section we will critically review a truth 
commission's activities in order to make some tentative conclusions about how they may or 
may not contribute towards this objective.   
 
   
Establishment of the Truth Commission and its Mandate 
2.2.1 The power balance between the authoritarian regime and the new government 
In this section we will examine how the power balance between the authoritarian regime and 
the new government influence the establishment of a truth commission. There is a general 
agreement among scholars that the relative power balance between the authoritarian rulers 
and the pro-democratic forces is “(…) the most important variable in explaining where truth 
commission are likely to emerge” (Brahm 2007: 14).19 The nature of the transition is thus 
considered to have a crucial impact on future human rights policies. Transitions are defined as 
the “interval between one regime and another” (O‟Donnell 1986: 6) and may also signify a 
movement towards another authoritarian regime or a revolutionary alternative (ibid).
20
 
Transitions are periods of uncertainty where the rules of the political games are not defined, 
instead they are in constant flux and continuously contested (ibid). The rules and procedures 
that do exist are at the discretionary hands of the rulers (ibid). The authoritarian rulers 
commonly control the Armed Forces and hold the upper hand in the transition. This does not 
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 See also  Zalaquett 1989; Pion-Berlin 1994; Barahona de Brito, Aguilar, and Gonzalez Enriquez 2001. An 
empirical study by Skaar largely supports this conclusion; it suggests that governments are most likely to 
establish truth commissions when the demands from the public and the authoritarian regime's demands are 
“roughly equal” (1999: 1109-1110).  
20
 Our understanding of a transition will also include the process of moving from state of war to a state of peace 
(Quinn and Freeman 2003: 1119). 
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mean the new regime‟s own preference is irrelevant, only that the boundaries of a human 
rights policy will be defined by those controlling the means of coercion especially if their own 
existence is at stake. Hence if a repressive military regime negotiates its own exit, it is very 
unlikely to support trials and prosecution against members of the regime. As Skaar observes, 
the former regime will always prefer inaction (1999: 1112) and if a truth commission is 
established it is because the outgoing regime cannot withstand the pressure for a policy on 
human rights. Consequently we would expect the former regime to challenge the 
establishment of a strong truth commission. Contrary, when a transition is the result of an 
overthrow by a pro-democratic opposition and the authoritarian regime does not enjoy the 
loyalty of the military, the political context will allow for a stronger policy on human rights. 
The new regime can mandate a stronger commission, because the former regime does not 
represent a threat to the new regime. Below we further develop this idea by applying 
Huntington‟s three-folded typology of transitions from his seminal work The Third Wave 
Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century (1991).  
 Huntington in his framework emphasises the relative strength between outgoing 
regime and the opposition and he analytically distinguishes between three types of 
transition.
21
 The first type he identifies is so-called transformations
22
 also referred to by 
Huyse as reform (1995: 113). Reform is the type of transition resulting from a process where 
the outgoing regime commonly dictates all the terms of exit: The transition is initiated by 
liberalisers within the authoritarian regime and is a process where the “regime reformists are 
able to steer the transition and define the boundaries of the new democracy” (Fishman 1990: 
432). The outgoing regime typically controls the means of coercion leaving the opposition 
weak with and with little leeway for negotiations. In these types of transitions prosecutions 
are almost non-existent. If the regime is too weak to resist a human rights policy it will “(...) 
strive to obtain iron-clad guarantees that under no circumstances will the past be unearthed” 
(O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1995: 58). Chile is an example of a „reform‟ transition where the 
president Patricio Alwyn was left with little room for a human rights policy after Pinochet 
stepped down from office in 1990. “The amnesty constrained Aylwin‟s options for responding 
to the abuses of the Pinochet regime. The president instead decided on a truth commission to 
establish the truth about the past” (Hayner 2001: 35). The Chilean truth commission was also 
vested with few investigative and reporting powers (ibid: 322). Realities are that transitional 
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 These categories of transition are for constructed for analytical purposes. Empirical cases are rarely this clear-
cut. 
22
 Huntington, 1991: 114. 
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governments often have formidable problems with addressing the authoritarian regime‟s 
human rights abuses, especially in cases where members of the former regime still retain a lot 
of political power and where the military is not subjected to civilian control (Valenzuela 
1990). Truth commissions therefore end up with few powers and little resources and often 
exist only to polish the façade of the new regime.  
 The second type Huntington identifies is transplacements also referred to as 
compromises by Huyse (1995: 113). Compromises involve “combined actions” of the old 
regime and the new government (Huntington 1995: 66) and are regularly accompanied by 
pacts. A pact is an agreement “among contending elites establishing formulas for i) sharing or 
alternating in office ii) distributing the spoils of office and  iii) constraining policy choices in 
areas of high salience to the groups involved” (O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1995: 58). The 
outgoing regime can make several demands in the pact-making which may involve blanket or 
conditional amnesties for members and associates of the former regime. A truth commission 
may be a part of the agreement, however the outgoing regime can force through so-called exit 
guarantees; “the assurance that the members of military will not be prosecuted for past human 
rights abuses” (ibid). One example is the TRC in South Africa which was a compromise 
solution negotiated by the governing National Party and the ANC guaranteeing a peaceful 
transition to democracy (Sarkin, 2004: 32-36). Although amnesties for politically motivated 
criminal acts
23
 where a part of this compromise, the commission was nevertheless endowed 
with extensive search and seizure and subpoena powers (Hayner 2001: 41). The commission 
was also granted the largest budget in the history of truth commissions. In „compromise‟ 
transitions a truth commission is often established because the former regime is not strong 
enough to enforce a policy of immunity and oblivion, and the new government does not 
posses the power to prosecute members of the authoritarian regime. Although it is not 
uncommon that the commission is bestowed with extensive legal powers the outgoing regime 
may negotiate guarantees that the findings cannot be used in court.  
 The last type of transitions is referred to as replacements also described by Huyse as 
overthrow (1995: 114). „Overthrows‟ are transitions where democratisation “results from the 
opposition gaining strength and the government losing strength until the government collapses 
or is overthrown” (O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1995: 65). If reformers within the regime exist, 
they are commonly too weak to push for an agenda. The chances for trials and prosecutions 
are greatest when democratisation is a product of an overthrow (Huyse 1995: 114), Ideally we 
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 A modified version of the Norgaard principles of politically motivated crimes was included in the TRC Act 
(Bhargava 2002). 
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would expect a commission with a strong mandate where the commission may serve as a 
preparatory exercise for later prosecutions, as was the case in Peru (Cueva 2007: 83). 
Considering the weakness of the authoritarian regime, the new regime will set the terms of 
negotiations. Argentina‟s Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) is an 
example of a truth commission established after an overthrow. It was born in the aftermath of 
the transition to democracy in 1983. The transition was initiated after the military 
administration collapsed as a result of the defeat in the Falkland Islands war and rendered the 
Armed Forces unable to negotiate the terms of its own exit (Sikkink and Booth Walling: 305). 
The truth commission was the first of its kind, and although its mandate was weak compared 
to its successors it was comparatively ground-breaking. Given this frame of reference we thus 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
 
 H.2.2.1: “Where the former authoritarian regime is strong relative to the new 
government this will lead to the establishment of a truth commission with a weak 
mandate.” 
 
For analytical purposes we give the variable The power balance between the authoritarian 
regime and the new government three values which correspond to three outcomes in 
reference to the establishment of commission and its mandate. The values are stated in the 
table below: 
 
Table 2.2.1: How the power balance between the authoritarian regime and the new 
government is assumed to influence the establishment of the commission and its mandate.  
The power balance between the authoritarian regime 
and  the new government 
Establishment of the commission and its 
mandate 
Strong authoritarian regime/Weak new government 
(reform) 
A commission's mandate will be weak. 
Prosecutions are precluded in the 
mandate.  
Authoritarian  regime and New government are equally  
strong (compromise) 
A commission's mandate will be 
moderately strong but coupled with 
amnesties. Prosecutions are precluded. 
Weak authoritarian regime/Strong  new government 
(overthrow) 
A commission's mandate will be strong 
and allows for recommendations to 
prosecute. 
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2.2.2 The human rights community  
In this section we will examine how the domestic and international human rights actors, here 
referred to as the human rights community, can influence the establishment of a truth 
commission in a society in transition. During an authoritarian era, fundamental political rights 
and civil liberties are typically abolished, which often also involves the right to organise. 
Political organisations within civil society are either tried co-opted into the government, or 
banned entirely (Gyimah-Boadi 1996: 123). Thus it is not uncommon that human rights 
activists are arrested, incarcerated and even prosecuted for illegal activities. In some societies 
the authoritarian regime has dismantled the organisational infrastructure of the civil society 
completely, but in less repressive regimes organisations may continue to operate illegally. In 
the last scenario human rights organisations often re-emerge as central actors on the political 
scene. Human rights issues however are global issues, thus it is not uncommon to observe 
international actors getting involved in transitional justice processes. Although international 
involvement in post-transitional societies is a controversial issue because it arguably 
challenges to the sovereignty of the state
24 
the international community has often played an 
important role by “encouraging a serious truth-seeking effort (…)” (Hayner 2001: 200) and 
demanding accountability for past crimes. This cross-pressure from domestic and 
international human rights organisations has created what Sikkink and Booth Walling refer to 
as „opportunity structures‟ where international and domestic human rights actors can, if there 
exists a general desire for truth-seeking, open up a space where human rights violations may 
be addressed (2007: 302).  
The new government wants to avoid reactions from the old regime, but it is also 
concerned with pleasing “(…) the electorate and giving a favourable impression to the 
international community” something which combined with public pressure can become an 
important political force for the establishment of a truth commission (Skaar 1999: 1125). For 
a nascent democratic state it is important to build legitimacy on the international arena, and 
the establishment of a truth commission is one way to increase its legitimacy. However even 
if the political will to establish a commission exists, a transitional government can be 
pressured into holding off investigations by potentially destabilising forces (Hayner 1995: 
250). During such circumstances domestic human rights activists and organisations may 
benefit from international involvement providing “(...) greater leeway to confront powerful 
forces within the country with less fear of reprisal” (ibid: 251). Crocker maintains a similar 
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 The issue of the rights and responsibilities of the international community to intervene is further discussed in 
Aukerman 2002. 
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position; He argues that effective truth commissions can in fact only be established with “(…) 
a vigorous domestic civil society, backed up on occasion by certain types of international civil 
society (…)” (2000: 109). 
 There are several empirical examples of case studies where complementary pressure 
from the domestic and international human rights community has played an important role in 
enforcing a stronger policy on human rights. In Argentina, after the military regime collapsed, 
international and domestic activists collaborated in order to pressure the Alfonsin government 
into adopting a proactive stance on human rights. Here international initiatives became a 
complement to domestic and regional activism (Sikkink and Booth Walling, 2007: 315). 
Guatemala and El Salvador are other examples where the processes leading up to the 
establishments of the truth commissions were collaborations between international 
community, represented by the UN, and domestic human rights organisations (Quinn and 
Freeman 2003: 1117-1123; Hayner 2001: 38-40). The Guatemalan History Clarification 
Commission was, similarly to the Salvadoran Commission, set up under “intense international 
pressure” (Popkin and Roht-Arriaza 1995: 92). Similarly in South Africa, domestic civil 
society organisations “helped forge the idea of a truth commission” (Crocker 2000: 110) and 
played a central role in “(…) composing the Commission and its mandate” (Rotberg, 2000: 
13). Here civil society benefitted from the widespread moral condemnation of the apartheid 
system and the international attention to the transitional justice process. Based on these 
observations we suggest the following hypothesis:  
 
H.2.2.2 “Strong pressure from the human rights community will compel the 
government to establish a truth commission with a strong mandate.” 
 
For analytical purposes we give the variable Pressure from the human rights community 
three values which correspond to three outcomes in reference to the establishment of the 
commission and its mandate. The values are stated in the table below: 
 
Table 2.2.2: How pressure from the human rights community is assumed to influence the 
establishment of the commission and its mandate.  
Pressure from the human rights community Establishment of the commission and its mandate
25
 
Weak pressure A commission's mandate will be weak.  
Moderate pressure A commission's mandate will be moderately strong. 
Strong pressure A commission's  mandate will be strong. 
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 Given that the mode of the transition allows for a truth commission to be established. 
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Fulfilment of the Objectives Stated in the Mandate 
2.2.3 Legal powers 
This section will be devoted to the examination of how a truth commission‟s legal powers 
relate to fulfilment of the objectives stated in the commission‟s mandate. As we already 
established the objectives of a truth commission may vary from cases to case, however a 
common denominator to all commissions is the duty to investigate and report. The violations 
under investigation and the scope and boundaries of the investigation will be outlined in the 
mandate. In general, the mandate will also ask the commission to recommend what would be 
the appropriate way to address the victims and perpetrators of these crimes. We will therefore 
focus on the powers which are related to investigations (subpoena, search and seizure, and 
witness protection powers) and reporting (powers of naming names as well powers to make 
recommendations)
 
(Hayner 2001: 322). Adjudicative powers such as power to grant amnesties 
and powers to authorise contracts of community work are also included in the framework.  
A truth commission must enjoy the necessary legal powers in order to conduct 
exhaustive investigations and obtain a complete picture of the past. Daly in fact considers 
legal powers to be one of the two most important factors for the fulfilment of the mandate 
(2001: 98).
26
 Extensive search and seizure powers are considered to contribute to more 
thorough investigations by giving the commission the necessary powers to call for evidence 
from official sources, state archives, databases and sources otherwise which may contribute to 
unearth the truth about human rights crimes. Moreover, a truth record is likely to be more 
comprehensive if the commissioners can summon witnesses to give testimony: It is not 
uncommon that both victims and perpetrators are unwilling to testify (Burgess 2007). 
Perpetrators will not implicate themselves in criminal activities and victims may fear the 
repercussions from perpetrators or consider testifying about past abuses to be too traumatic. In 
these situations a truth commission with summoning powers can compel witness to come 
forward if this considered appropriate. In cases where the danger of repercussion is real, 
witness protection powers are a logical extension of a commission's legal powers.  
Several empirical studies reveal that weak legal powers may result in a superficial and 
unbalanced account of the past: In Timor Leste the commission did not have the powers to 
summon alleged perpetrators something which resulted in a one-sided account of the 
incidents. (Burgess 2007: 202). Similarly the Chilean truth commission did not enjoy 
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 A truth commission can be established by the legislature (South Africa), the executive (Chile) or through a 
peace agreement (El Salvador) (Freeman 2006: 28). It is important to note that the powers to imbue truth 
commissions with the legal powers such as the power to “compel testimony or to search premises and seize 
evidence” rests, in most states, with the legislative branch (ibid).    
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summoning powers and the lack of cooperation on the military‟s part thus led to a narrow 
interpretation of the political mandate (Popkin and Roht-Arriaza 1995: 97). The Guatemalan 
truth commission did not have the powers to name names and although it did find the Armed 
Forces to be accountable for thousands of human rights violations, individual accountability 
could not be reported even in the face of overwhelming evidence (Keller 2000).
 
In contrast the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission held “summons or subpoena powers, 
search and seizure powers (with concomitant penalties for non-cooperation), and witness 
protection powers” (Freeman 2006: 34). The last case is an example of by far the most 
ambitious undertaking of a truth commissions till today and the resulting report has made it 
impossible to doubt the apartheid past.  
Data from the last 20 years and onwards reveal that younger truth commissions enjoy 
more legal powers than their predecessors. Some of the first commissions such as the 
Argentinean National Commission on the Disappeared (1983) and the Chilean Rettig 
Commission (1990) were granted few investigative powers. According to Hayner this led to a 
narrow interpretation of the mandate (2001: 34, 36). This claim is also supported by Popkin 
and Roht-Arriaza (1995: 97) who state that the lack of power to “compel testimony and 
production of documents, the inability to call hostile witnesses, preserve or obtain documents, 
and or visit military or police installations (..)” has prevented most commissions from 
producing more than mere description of patterns of abuses (ibid). Later commissions such as 
the Salvadoran truth commission enjoyed extensive legal powers, as well as powers to name 
names and mandatory recommendations: In its final report the commission implicated over 
“40 senior members of the military, judiciary and armed opposition for their role in the 
atrocities” (Hayner 2001: 39).27  
 Some truth commissions enjoy adjudicative powers such as the power to grant 
amnesty and the power to authorise community contracts. Many theorists consider these 
powers vital to compel witnesses of abuses to come forward and testify. The granting of 
amnesties and community work (instead of incarceration) in exchange for the truth are 
powerful tools which can contribute to the production of a more comprehensive truth record. 
These powers however are considered very controversial because they violate the principle of 
proportionality; the punishment should fit the crime. Furthermore they undermine truth 
commissions in the role they can play in achieving criminal justice. Nevertheless, they are 
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 The Salvadoran government reacted by passing a sweeping amnesty law which guaranteed the alleged 
perpetrators impunity from prosecutions (Hayner, 2001: 91). “El Salvador is the clearest case to date of an 
amnesty law passed into law as a direct response to a truth commission's report” (ibid). 
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utilised in contexts where truth is considered a more important goal than retributive justice. 
These strategies are also favoured by commissions guided by the notion that amnesties for 
truth can contribute to reconciling estranged parties. The powers to grant amnesty in exchange 
for truth was utilised with moderate success in South Africa (Sarkin, 2004). Also in Timor 
Leste the granting of community contracts was viewed as a legitimate tool for obtaining 
truthful testimonies from perpetrators. Based on these observations we outline the following 
hypothesis: 
    
H.2.2.3 “A truth commission endowed with extensive legal powers (search and seizure 
powers, reporting powers, amnesty powers) is more likely to fulfil the objectives 
stated in the mandate.” 
 
For analytical purposes we give the variable Legal powers three values which correspond to 
three outcomes in reference to the fulfilment of the political mandate. The values are stated in 
the table below: 
 
Table 2.2.3: How legal powers are assumed to influence the fulfilment of the objectives stated 
in the mandate.  
Legal powers Fulfilment of the objectives stated in the mandate
28
 
Few Incomplete 
Some Partial 
Extensive Complete 
 
 
2.2.4 Monetary resources 
Truth commissions are challenging ventures which demand a considerable amount of 
monetary resources in order to become genuine instruments of truth-seeking. Sufficient 
resources are thus a vital factor in terms of fulfilling a commission's objectives. In this section 
we further examine to what extent monetary resources or the lack thereof influences the work 
of the commission and its ability to fulfil its mandate.  
Truth commissions are not under any circumstances modest undertakings and should 
not be expected to fulfil their duties without sufficient resources.
29
 Salaries to staff, office 
space, investigations of cases, travel expenses to take statements from victims and the conduct 
of public hearings are typically large items on a commission‟s budget. Brahm suggests that 
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 Given that the other independent variables are at a constant maximum value. 
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 A truth commission's budget today tends to vary between 5 and 10 million USD (Freeman 2006: 31). 
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the funding affects both the quality and the quantity of the works of truth commissions: “(...) 
well-funded truth commissions seem likely to be better able to hire more staff and 
consequently, to investigate a greater number of cases and do so more thoroughly” (2007: 30). 
In many transitional states however the national economy is in poor conditions and the 
government struggles to meet the social and economic needs of its population. Transitional 
administrations often rely on foreign and international donors to fuel their budgets and in 
some cases they also fund truth commissions partly or in its entirety. This is not necessarily a 
bad thing for a truth commission: In societies where the public expresses a general distrust in 
governments, truth commissions will lose legitimacy if the funding is conditional on the 
goodwill of the government and as a consequence its ability to fulfil its duties in an unbiased 
manner will be questioned. This dilemma can be resolved with the use of international donors: 
Many truth commissions rely on international funding entirely such as the Salvadoran truth 
commission which was “financed by the US, EC, the Netherlands, Scandinavia and the UN 
mounting to a total of two and a half million dollars” (Buergenthal 1995: 296). Another 
example is the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission where the majority of the 
funding came from international donors (Schabas, 2005: 133). Some commissions also 
receive a mix of national and international funding such as Peruvian truth commission 
(Freeman 2006: 31).  
 There are examples of truth commissions which were brought into stalemate due to 
severe underfunding. Brahm observes that “(...) budgetary problems forced Uganda‟s 
CIVHR
30
 to close for extended periods and the Chadian commission was forced to take up 
residence in a former detention centre” (2007: 30). The Haitian truth commission is a third 
example of a commission which never finished its report due to insufficient funding (Call 
2004: 104). On the other end of the scale we find the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission which had a budget of 18 million USD each year (Hayner 2001: 41). Despite 
generous funding, the South African TRC has often been criticised for a superficial 
interpretation and implementation of its mandate (Quinn and Freeman 2003: 1126). 
Commissions such as the South African TRC with clearly stated objectives of reconciliation 
and individual healing demand a greater deal of resources than commissions which primary 
focus is data collection and processing. On the other hand, commissions like the Salvadoran 
and the Chilean suggest that “extremely large budgets (...) are not necessary for real social 
change” (Brahm 2007: 30). 
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 Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights. 
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The notion of what constitutes sufficient resources is relative to the breadth of the mandate of 
the truth commission. We nevertheless argue that there is a lower threshold for funding 
considering the fact that there are basic tasks truth commissions have to carry out: 
Commissions must be able to hire qualified and specifically trained staff and investigators to 
record stories and narratives, but also conduct in-depth investigations, verify facts and seek 
alternative information sources (Quinn and Freeman 2003: 1137). It follows that a truth 
commission which cannot carry out basic logistical tasks is rendered inoperable and is 
unlikely to be an instrument of genuine truth-seeking. Based on these observations we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H. 2.2.4: “A truth commission with generous monetary resources is more likely to 
achieve the objectives stated in the mandate.” 
 
For analytical purposes we give the variable Monetary resources three values which 
correspond to three outcomes in reference to the fulfilment of the political mandate. The 
values are stated in the table below. The values are relative to the size of the commission's 
mandate. 
   
Table 2.2.4: How monetary resources are assumed to influence the fulfilment of the objectives 
stated in the mandate.  
Monetary Resources Fulfilment of objectives stated in the mandate
31
 
Insufficient Incomplete 
Reasonable Partial  
Generous Complete  
 
 
2.2.5 Time frame 
A truth commission is a temporary body which operates for a limited period of time. The 
deadline for a commission‟s work is typically stated in the mandate of the commission 
however some commissions are given the discretion to extend the length of their operations 
(Freeman 2006: 32). In this section we will examine how the time frame influences a 
commission‟s work and the fulfilment of its obligations.  
Truth commissions are dependent on the necessary time to conduct proper 
investigations and write their reports. The time necessary for a commission to complete its 
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 Given that the other independent variables are at a constant maximum value. 
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work may however vary from case to case. This is not unexpected considering the great 
diversity in mandates and investigative periods. Commissions conducting public hearings 
commonly have a longer operational time, than those that do not. Freeman further notes that 
most commission which do not conduct public hearings typically operate for one year or less, 
meanwhile those that do not, operate for two years or more (2006: 32) Empirical studies show 
that many truth commissions experience time constraints which can lead investigations and 
analyses to be carried out in a hastened and superficial manner. This was the case of the 
Salvadoran truth commission. It was mandated to investigate “serious acts of violence” 
between 1980 and 1991 (Buergenthal 1995: 293). The six-month deadline however “rendered 
the commission unable to investigate more than a careful selection of cases” (ibid: 297-298). 
Even though the time limit was extended, the commission had to focus its investigations on a 
few selective and representative cases. The Rettig Commission in Chile experienced similar 
problems; due to insufficient investigative time, the commission was only able to investigate 
violations which resulted in deaths (Stanley 2005: 589). Daly observes similar struggles in 
South Africa: Temporal limitations in the legal mandate of the South African TRC prevented 
the commission “from examining and therefore explaining the historical context that gave rise 
to the extreme violence that characterised the mandate period” (2001: 142). Unsurprisingly, 
the overwhelming amount of cases presented to the commissions leaves most of them 
struggling to meet the deadline (Freeman 2006).  
 At the other end of the spectrum we observe truth commissions where there was no 
time limit: The Ugandan Commission of Inquiry lasted for more than 9 years and as expected 
people lost faith in its report ever being published (Hayner 1995: 249). This suggests that an 
unlimited time frame is not of preference (ibid: 259). Since truth commissions show great 
variation in their mandates, the time needed to complete their objectives will vary 
accordingly. However as Quinn and Freeman observe minimally truth commissions need “(...) 
sufficient time to cover the injustices committed during the authoritarian past, including extra 
preparatory time” (2003: 1129-1130). To this we also add extra time to as finish the final 
report.  Based on these observations we outline the following hypothesis: 
 
H. 2.2.5: “A truth commission with a long time frame is more likely to achieve the 
objectives stated in the mandate.” 
 
This proposition however rests on the presupposition of a clearly defined cut-off point for the 
commission‟s work. For analytical reasons we give the variable Time frame three different 
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values. The values are relative to the size of the mandate:   
 
Table 2.2.5: How the time frame is assumed to influence the fulfilment of the objectives stated 
in the mandate. 
Time frame Fulfilment of the objectives stated in the mandate
32
 
Insufficient Incomplete 
Reasonable Partial  
Generous (with a 
deadline) 
Complete  
 
 
 
Implementation of Recommendations 
2.2.6 The power balance between the authoritarian regime and the new government  
This section is devoted to the examination of how the relative power balance between the old 
regime and the new government influences the implementation of a commission‟s 
recommendations. A truth commission typically presents a set of recommendations in its final 
report where it includes propositions of government reforms,
33
 lustration and compensation to 
the victims. Some reports also name names and make recommendations of criminal 
investigations and prosecutions. However a truth commission is not an adjudicative body and 
it does not have the power to enforce its own recommendations. When a commission has 
completed its report, the implementation of the recommendations is at the discretionary hands 
of the government. The recommendations of a truth commission are a proposed response to 
severe and systematic human rights abuses where a majority of these have been committed by 
the former regime. The government‟s ability to act is therefore constrained according to the 
relative strength of the former regime.  
In a democracy, the military is not an actor on the political scene and it does not 
partake in political decision-making. It is subjected to civilian control and its primary function 
is to protect the state from external aggression. The civilian government is thus insulated from 
unduly military influence. An authoritarian regime on the other hand is inherently a system of 
coercion. In order to secure its own survival the regime typically employ Armed Forces to 
suppress the opposition and eliminate individuals or groups considered to be a threat, real or 
perceived, to the regime. Thus, in transitional states we often find that the military has “(…) 
notorious problems with leaving politics, something which, to a varying degree, will constrain 
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 Given that the other independent variables are at a constant maximum value. 
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 Reforming the Armed Forces, Security Sector and purging the government branches of authoritarian elements 
are ordinarily high on the agenda. 
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and affect the future policy-choices of the new government, especially in the area of human 
rights violations” (O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1995: 62). If the military took part in systematic 
repression it will try to protect itself from human rights issues after the transition (Stepan, 
1988: 69). This is particularly true in cases where the military still retain a strong position 
even after the transition. Hayner observes in her study of fifteen truth commissions that in 
eleven cases the military remained “largely unchanged and a potentially destabilising force” 
(1995: 250).
34
 Military influence in nascent democracies may be miniscule when the 
institution is subjected to democratic control
35
 and the power exercised on the political scene 
is formalised and transparent. However in cases where the Armed Forces still retain a lot of 
power, the military may reappear on the political scene as a coherent and authoritative force, 
influencing political decision-making both through formal channels as well as informally and 
indirectly. This is particularly true in regimes where the military becomes extremely 
politicised which is the case in militocracies. In militocracies the military takes on the role as 
the state's executive administration, often through a personalistic style of ruling. It is a system 
“that values and accords primacy in state and society to the Armed Forces” (Ajayi 2007: 97). 
If the military continues to influence politics after the return to democracy, even non-
retributive responses to human rights violations may be perceived as threatening.  
Even though truth commissions do not have the power to sanction they can, as Pion-
Berlin observes, become an impetus carrying events “further than desired. (…)” (1995: 95) 
and “energise societal calls for justice” (ibid). In these societies the new government will have 
greater difficulties carrying out reforms and dispose of elements that are loyal to the former 
regime (Fishman 1990: 429).
36
 One example of this is El Salvador where the commission 
would not recommend prosecutions in its final report because of the lack of independence of 
the courts (Roht-Arriaza, 1998: 850). As Popkin and Roht-Arriaza observe: “The militaries, 
and their civilian supporters, retained a major share of power and were disinclined to allow 
legal action against their own” (1995: 103). Instead it advised the government to reform the 
judicial branch and the Security Sector (Arnson 1993: 21). The Salvadoran government‟s 
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 The truth commissions were established in: Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Uganda (1974), Uganda (1986), The 
Philippines, Chile, Chad, Germany, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Africa (ANC I), South Africa (ANC 
II) and Zimbabwe (Hayner 1995: 225-261). 
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 We use the term democratic control rather than civil control of the military to distinguish real democratic  
control from scenarios where the military is under civilian control, but where the authority is not necessarily 
democratic (Cawthra and  Luckham 2003).  
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 This may occur through a process formally known as vetting. Vetting is process where the background of 
employees in the public sector is carefully examined in order to remove human rights violators from their jobs 
through “forced retirement” or by denying the same persons future employment in this sector (Mobekk 2006: 
68). 
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subsequent refusal of the commission's findings and its decision to grant sweeping amnesties 
to all alleged perpetrators reflect the imminent fear of a military response had the 
commission‟s report gained further momentum. As Hayner observes; “El Salvador is the 
clearest case to date of an amnesty law passed into law as a direct response to a truth 
commission's report” (2001: 91). 
Where amnesties are not a part of the pacts negotiated between the old and the new 
regime, truth commissions may recommend criminal investigations and prosecutions of 
members of the former regime. In some states commissions serve as preparatory exercises for 
later prosecutions. This was the case in Argentina and Peru where the commissions handed 
over the findings to the Prosecutor‟s Office (Cueva 2007: 83). However it is not uncommon 
that the military constitute a genuine threat to the new regime, precluding any opportunities 
for prosecutions of members of the former regime. Realities are such that very few members 
of the former regime are prosecuted and punished even when pacts are absent. Reports which 
do recommend prosecutions are therefore more problematic to enforce than reports which do 
not seek to establish strong links of accountability.  
In her empirical study of transitions and associated human rights policy, Skaar finds 
that transitional governments are rather under- than overachievers in terms of human rights 
policies, even when the former regime is weak (1999). In Chile for instance the Rettig 
Commission suggested prosecution of several army officers, however many of these cases 
“have been suspended or amnestied with either no judicial investigation or only partial 
investigation (…)” (Report of the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, 1995: 
104). Pion-Berlin notes that this was explicit decision to avoid a conflict between the new 
government and the military (2006: 26). As Mobekk observes “(…) the fear of destabilisation 
and renewed conflict is a primary reason why new regimes sometimes avoid prosecution and 
why commentators frequently argue against it (…)” (2006: 25). Based on these observations 
we suggest the following hypothesis:  
   
 H.2.2.6: “Where the former authoritarian regime is strong relative to new government 
this will lead to an incomplete implementation of the commission's 
recommendations.” 
 
We give the variable three values which correspond to three outcomes in reference to the 
implementation of the recommendations in the report. The values are stated in the table 
below: 
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Table 2.2.6: How the power balance between the authoritarian regime and the new 
government is assumed to influence the implementation of the commission’s 
recommendations.  
The power balance between the authoritarian regime 
and  the new government 
Implementation of recommendations 
37
 
Strong authoritarian regime/Weak new government Incomplete (No or few recommendations 
are implemented)  
Authoritarian  regime and new government are equally  
strong 
Partial (Some recommendations and non-
retributive recommendations are 
implemented) 
Weak authoritarian regime/Strong  new government Complete (A majority of the 
recommendations including retributive 
sanctions are implemented 
 
2.2.7 The human rights community 
Truth commissions can, if they receive support from civil society, become a force for social 
change. As Hayner observes truth commissions, although they do not possess adjudicative 
powers, can become “(…) a pressure point around which civilian society and the international 
community can lobby for change in the future” (1995: 225). They will however have limited 
impact if new governments do not implement the recommendations which the commissions 
make. In transitional societies where the government lacks the political will and/or the ability 
to implement the propositions made by the truth commission the human rights community can 
positively influence the government into adopting proactive policies on human rights. In this 
section we will thus examine how and the human rights community can influence the 
implementation of truth commissions‟ recommendations.  
In a transitional society the new government is typically caught in the cross-fire 
between the former regime which will try to avoid accountability and human rights 
organisations demanding action on salient human rights issues. A government feels a stronger 
obligation to address human rights violations when civil society monitors and assesses 
whether the government keeps its promises and translates words into action (Crocker 2000: 
111). A strong civil society can also generate the necessary media attention directing the eyes 
of the international community towards the new government, further increasing the pressure 
to implement the recommendations. However if these actions are viewed as threatening by the 
old regime, the latitude of the new government will be constrained accordingly, particularly if 
the government fear that even recommendations of moderate reforms and non-retributive 
justice might energise demands for stronger accountability for human rights abuses. On the 
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other hand, a new government needs to build domestic legitimacy in order to secure the 
survival of the regime. Thus complying with a demand for stronger policies on human rights 
can be a successful part of a strategy to win the next elections. 
Legitimacy on the international arena is also a central issue to new states and a 
proactive stance on human rights may be instrumental in achieving this. Empirical 
observations suggest that truth commission can play a vital role in achieving justice for 
human rights breaches: In Argentina regional human rights activists‟ concerted effort 
contributed to the prosecution of several military officers. Similarly in Chile, domestic and 
international human rights activists cooperated in order to have Augusto Pinochet prosecuted 
for crimes against humanity (Sikkink and Booth Walling, 2007: 313-316). In South Africa the 
government was under fierce attack from domestic human rights groups who criticised the 
government for failing to compensate the victims of human rights violations and prosecute 
perpetrators who did not apply for amnesties (Crocker 2000: 112). This pressure was however 
not enough to compel the government into complying with the commission‟s 
recommendations. Based on these observations we suggest the following hypothesis: 
 
 H.2.2.7 “A strong pressure from the human rights community will compel the 
 government to implement the recommendations of a truth commission.”    
 
For analytical purposes we give the variable three values which correspond to three outcomes 
in reference to the implementation of the recommendations in the report. The values are stated 
in the table below: 
 
2.2.7: How pressure from the human rights community is assumed to influence the 
implementation of the commission’s recommendations.  
Pressure from the  human rights community Implementation of recommendations 
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Weak Incomplete  
Moderate  Partial  
Strong Complete  
 
 
2.2.8 The judiciary 
Unlike truth commissions, the judicial branch of a democratic government has the 
adjudicative powers to enforce retributive justice. If truth commissions make 
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recommendations of criminal investigations and prosecutions in their reports, these cannot be 
pursued without a functioning court system. The purpose of this section is to establish the role 
of the judiciary in the implementation of recommendations of criminal sanctions.  
 It is not uncommon for truth commissions to recommend criminal investigations into 
the responsibility of former leaders and military officers for authorising and executing 
criminal acts against the civilian population however more often than not prosecutions are not 
pursued. Prosecutions may not be plausible for a number of reasons. Political circumstances 
may prevent future prosecutions because guarantees of impunity have been agreed to and 
amnesty laws have been adopted. Unless these are repealed or judged unconstitutional they 
often limit the prospects of retributive justice. In societies in transition the judicial branch 
itself sometimes constitutes an obstacle to retributive justice: The judiciary is typically the 
first victim of an authoritarian regime. As Roht-Arriaza and Gibson observes 
 
 Some authoritarian regimes “(...) retain the judiciary out of necessity, it often seeks to 
 neutralise the institution either by destroying or diminishing its judicial authority or by 
 luring it into compromise through promises of respect for judicial determinations, 
 adequate funding or even force or intimidation” (1998: 843-885).  
 
Sometimes the regime tries to influence the court system by sacking disloyal judges and using 
threats and bribes to influence court decisions in its favour. At other times the judicial branch 
has been suspended all together, the constitution is annulled and the country is ruled by 
decree. As a consequence the judiciary is typically plagued with challenges, both 
administrative and institutionally when the country returns to democracy: “Infrastructural 
deficiencies are huge and prevents thee fair and accurate execution of justice” (Oko 2005: 42). 
Oko further notes that very often the system is fraught with corrupt judges who are still loyal 
to the former regime (ibid: 42). 
The Salvadoran case is an example of the authoritarian regime's stranglehold of the 
state institutions: As the Salvadoran Commission on Truth observes: “None of the three 
branches of government – judicial, legislative, or executive – was capable of restraining the 
military's overwhelming control of society” (1995: 201). As a consequence after the civil war 
ended, the courts system was staffed by supporters of the old regime and unable to uphold and 
protect the values of a democratic regime (Daly 2001). Similar events took place in Chile 
under the Pinochet regime. Although the regime did not interfere with judicial processes to 
the same extent as in Argentina “(...) jurisdictional authorities in the field of human rights 
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were conspicuously deficient” (National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, 1995: 
125). The Chilean Commission further notes that the judiciary succumbing to the military 
junta led to “(...) an intensification in the process of systematic violations of human rights 
(...)” (ibid). This also had consequences in the long run because a tradition for impunity for 
repressive actions was institutionalised (ibid). Consequently the cases in which the Chilean 
truth commission recommended further prosecutions were “(...) suspended or amnestied with 
either no judicial investigation or only partial investigation (...)” (ibid: 163). The lack of “(…) 
judicial independence helps to explain the failure of the courts in these countries to invalidate 
amnesty laws and to uphold provisions of the constitution” (Roht-Arriaza and Gibson 1998: 
878). 
 In some, although a lot fewer, cases the judiciary emerges relatively unscathed from 
the authoritarian period and prosecutions are feasible. Here truth commissions can play an 
important part in the investigations and later prosecutions of members of an oppressive 
regime.
39
 The Argentinean case is an example of how several members of the Military Junta 
were prosecuted and sentenced to prison. Although the judiciary was dramatically subverted 
after the Armed Forces came to power in 1976 the judiciary recovered after the return to 
democracy. The Argentinean National Commission on the Disappeared truth (CONADEP) 
handed over its findings to the judiciary and worked in a complementary manner with the 
judiciary to prosecute individuals responsible for authorising and executing the crimes 
committed by the authoritarian regime. As Hayner observes, the CONADEP “(...) played a 
critical role in the trial against members of the former military junta leadership, serving as a 
model for the positive relationship that can exist between truth commissions and later 
prosecutions” (2001: 93). Based on these observations we suggest the following hypothesis: 
     
H.2.2.8: “Unless there is an uncompromised judiciary, recommendations of criminal 
sanctions will not be implemented.” 
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 In countries which base their legal system on civil law, the method of criminal procedure differs from that of 
common-law countries. Civil law legal systems emphasise the role of the judge. The judge is “(…) normally 
responsible for calling and questioning all witnesses, and the process is not separated into two distinct phases of 
trial and sentencing (…)” (http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/142953/crime/261349/Anglo-American-
countries#ref=ref990917). Furthermore, most civil law countries maintain the principle of mandatory 
prosecution. This means that prosecutors in theory must prosecute “(…) all crimes that come to their attention, 
according to the letter of the law (…)” ( ibid). Conversely in common-law countries the process of prosecution is 
distinguished from investigation and adjudication. Prosecutions are ordinarily performed by an authority which 
is neither a part of the police nor the judicial system. Here the Prosecutor enjoys extensive discretion in deciding 
whether or not to institute criminal proceedings (ibid). In some countries the Prosecutor‟s Office is directly 
subordinate to the executive branch (ibid). In democratic states this subordination is only theoretical, whereas in 
less democratic states this relationship is often abused by the executive, unduly influencing the procedures of the 
prosecuting attorney.  
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For analytical purposes we give the variable three values which correspond to three outcomes 
in reference to the implementation of criminal sanctions recommended in the report. The 
values are stated in the table below: 
 
Table 2.2.8 How the judiciary is assumed to influence the implementation of the commission’s 
recommendation of criminal sanctions.  
The judiciary Implementation of recommendations of criminal sanctions 
40
 
Weak Incomplete  
Moderate  Partial  
Strong Complete  
 
 
 
Pursuit of Reconciliation 
2.2.9 Reconciliatory activities  
Truth commissions are often heralded as innovative transitional justice mechanisms with the 
ability to reconcile the seemingly antithetical notions of justice and reconciliation. As we 
recall reconciliation is a multifaceted concept which can take place on several levels. It may 
refer to a simple agreement to resolve conflicts through the use of non-violent means, while a 
„thicker‟ version of reconciliation also involve interaction for common policy-making, 
forgiveness and healing (Crocker 2000). What lies behind truth commissions‟ assumed 
contribution to reconciliation? Some theorists argue that the production of a truth record can 
promote reconciliation. A truth record is unifying in the sense that it takes into account 
several perspectives but at the same time is a systematic and lucid account of the abuse that 
took place; it is a production of a collective memory. Some truth commissions in their reports 
also recommend reconciliatory initiatives which can be conducive to peace-building and the 
reinforcement of democratic norms and values. Furthermore truth commissions sometimes 
hold public hearings which can become a space where perpetrators and victims reconcile. 
Some transitional societies exhibit lower level of conflict and violence after a truth-seeking 
process has taken place. The degree to which these outcomes can be attributed to the work of 
a truth commission is however disputed. The premises for reconciliation to take place are not 
readily understood and the difficulties in separating reconciliation as a result of truth 
commission's work and reconciliation as a consequence of factors in the political landscape 
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prevent us from making a conclusive argument about the relationship between truth 
commissions and reconciliation. Thus, in this section we will judge a commission to be 
successful insofar as it promotes reconciliation through reconciliatory activities: Firstly we 
examine the reconciliatory role of a truth record and its recommendations, before we outline 
the role of public hearings in reconciliation.   
 The act of agreeing on a common understanding of the past is according to Crocker the 
first step towards reconciliation. As Crocker observes “(…) if reconciliation in any of its 
several senses is to take place, there must be some agreement about what happened and why. 
Former enemies are unlikely to be reconciled if what count as lies for one side are verities for 
the other” (2000: 101). Truth commissions can contribute to this through the production of an 
integrative truth report. This creation of a trustworthy account of the past “(..) is particularly 
important in polarised societies where interpretations of history are contested and potentially 
form the basis for future conflicts” (Popkin and Roht-Arriaza 1995: 93). A comprehensive 
truth record can therefore play a role in establishing common grounds where future 
interaction, cooperation and policy-making take place. As Gairdner observes; the past must be 
agreed on to the extent that it will not be an issue in future policy-making (1999: 55). A 
collective memory can also be important in order for individuals and communities to 
reconnect and forgive. As Hayner maintains one must know what to forgive in order to 
forgive (2001: 157). Problems can however arise if the truth report is perceived as unbalanced 
and biased. Critics of truth commissions claim that the extent to which they are reconciliatory 
is predicated on the participation of all relevant parties of the conflict and that the 
reconciliatory potential will be weakened when some parties choose not to participate. This 
was the case in South Africa where the majority of the apartheid regime‟s supporters did not 
partake in the truth commission process and as a result the report became, in some people's 
views, a one-sided record of the past (Minow 1998: 336). Where conflicts cannot be reduced 
through writing a report or by holding public hearings, the commissioners may include in 
their reports recommendations for government initiatives to resolve political and social 
conflicts. Such initiatives, if implemented, can ease the tension between individuals and 
communities and lessen the quest for revenge. Sometimes conflicts have socio-economic 
dimensions and can be reduced if the government develops a policy to reduce poverty, 
improve resource management, and expand welfare services and so forth.  
  Some truth commissions hold public hearings for witnesses to give testimonies about 
human rights atrocities. These types of hearings are supposed to provide a public arena where 
victims of abuses can be heard and give testimony about their experiences and where the 
48 
 
public can gain knowledge about the abuses that took place. Public hearings have grown in 
popularity since the South African TRC in 1994.
41
 Some are broadcasted in both radio and 
television such as the public hearings in South Africa. In South Africa both victims and 
perpetrators were called to give testimony. The hearings were supposed to provide a space 
where the victims‟ sufferings were exposed and their traumas were acknowledged. It was also 
a place where perpetrators could confess to their crimes and receive amnesty from future 
prosecutions in exchange. The perpetrators were given an opportunity to ask the victims or 
their relatives for forgiveness, although show of remorse was not a requirement to receive 
amnesty. This approach was, unlike court trials, considered to be reconciliatory. However 
“contrary to what might have been expected, the TRC-truth did not seem to bring 
reconciliation” (Gloppen 2002: 27). Hayner makes similar observations about the South 
African TRC: “Most amnesty-hearings did not end on a reconciliatory note” (Hayner 2001: 
158).  
The CRPs (The Community Reconciliation Processes) associated with the Timor Leste 
Truth Commission (The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation) were of a 
slightly different character than the public hearings in South Africa, which often took the like 
of trials (Burgess 2007: 198). The commission in Timor Leste aimed “to provide a space for 
perpetrators, victims and communities to seek solutions for reconciliation and reacceptance of 
those who have committed „harmful acts‟ to the community” (ibid: 177). A mixture of 
concepts “drawn from criminal law, civil procedure, mediation, arbitration, and local 
traditional and spiritual practices” were applied in the process (ibid). Forgiveness was a 
central element in the hearings: The key to forgiveness lay in the „strength of the confession 
of the Deponents‟. “Full and frank statements”, sincerity and apology, not the gravity of the 
act was most important for reconciliation (ibid: 188). This approach to reconciliation seemed 
to be productive: Victims said the Community Reconciliation Process helped to understand 
motivation and circumstances for actions of perpetrator (ibid: 187-188). Many of the 
perpetrators also claimed that CRPs helped repairing their relationship with the community 
(ibid).  
Why was the CRP process more successful than the public hearings in South Africa? 
On one level it seems like the truth commission in Timor Leste was more successful in 
practicing what has been coined restorative justice. Restorative justice is by many scholars 
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 Many political contexts however do not allow for public hearings to take place. On example is El Salvador 
where the circumstances were the military still constituted an imminent threat to peace even after the war had 
ceased. In this case public hearings were not an option (Brockett 1994) 
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viewed as instrumental in achieving reconciliation: It was also promoted in South Africa, 
however with less success. What is restorative justice? It is a form of justice which is victim-
centred and aimed towards restoring human dignity and honour, and also believed to 
contribute to personal healing (Minow 1998: 329-332). The boundaries of this concept are 
blurred, and in order to understand how restorative justice can contribute to reconciliation we 
apply Johnston and van Ness‟ understanding of the term. They claim that restorative justice is 
predicated on the participation of all affected parties of a crime in face-to-face encounters 
(Johnstone and van Ness 2007: 13). The participation at these meetings must be mutually 
voluntary where the goal is to reach an agreement on reasonable reparative actions (ibid: 13). 
These may involve agreements on monetary or other forms of compensations to victims, as 
well as the terms of rehabilitation and reintegration of the perpetrator(s) into society. The 
active involvement of the victim in these encounters is of unique importance for the very 
reason that the victim will always know best what would be restorative for her/him (ibid: 44). 
The encounters also create opportunities for repentance and forgiveness.  
Although the long-term effects are not known, the Community Reconciliation 
Processes seem to have been more successful than their South African counterparts. Burgess 
find that the “(…) target communities view CRPs, in general to have been a significant 
success” (Burgess 2007: 177). The community participation processes also reached a 
significant portion of the public: In March 2006 1471 cases were completed and 30-40.000 
community members had participated in the hearings (ibid: 187). In South Africa contrary to 
expectations a national poll showed that “(…) two-thirds of the public believed that 
revelations resulting from the truth commission process had made South Africans angrier and 
led to deterioration in relations between races (…). Only 17 percent predicted people would 
become more forgiving” (Hayner 2001: 156). 
Why were restorative justice initiatives more successful in Timor Leste than in South 
Africa? In Timor Leste the perpetrators had to make significant efforts to avoid criminal 
prosecutions. Perpetrators were required to pay money or symbolic valuable items to the 
victim, provide the victim with animals, help repair victim‟s house or make other forms of 
atonement (ibid: 194-195). In the CRPs the perpetrator was also strongly encouraged to 
apologise for his/her actions. Truthful testimony and the sincerity of the apology was the key 
to forgiveness (ibid: 188). In South Africa, although the perpetrators were required to give 
truthful testimony in order to be granted amnesty, the requirements for atonement were not as 
severe. The TRC did not require show of remorse, nor were perpetrators obligated to 
compensate the victim beyond giving truthful testimony of their crimes. As Stephen 
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Friedman, director at the Center of Policy Studies in Johannesburg notes; “(…) it would have 
been better if the amnesty applicants had been required to show repentance and possibly 
commit themselves to some kind of community service” (cited in Graybill 2002: 73). 
Furthermore in the CRPs, only minor crimes were dealt with. Unlike South Africa, in Timor 
Leste perpetrators of murder and torture did not receive clemency. By granting amnesties for 
abuses of a very grave nature, the TRC may have contributed to further anger and discord 
rather than to unite a deeply conflicted society  
Although restorative justice as practiced in Timor Leste seemed to yield positive 
results, many scholars are cautious in their praise of truth commissions. As van der Merwe 
observes: “Reconciliation is not an event. People cannot simply one day decide that they want 
to forgive and forget” (2001: 157). Although truth commissions can open up spaces where 
forgiveness, personal healing and the restoration of human dignity may take place, these 
sentiments are individual-driven and depend on the unique and individual experiences of the 
victims. Thus when restorative justice is promoted by bodies such as truth commissions one 
can question whether such private feelings of human dignity and worth can at all be 
administered by an administrative organ (Wilson 2001: 544). Hayner also recognises this 
point and notes that reconciliation generally is too complex and “(...) difficult to achieve by 
means of a national commission” (2001: 154). 
A second limitation to truth commissions and reconciliation is their temporary nature: 
Truth commissions only exist for a finite period of time. They have limited powers and 
resources, consequently their contribution to reconciliation will also be limited. 
Reconciliation is a process and cannot be expected to happen over night. It is in Wilson's 
words “wishful thinking” that one public hearing can lead to long-lasting results (Wilson 
2001: 550). A truth commission can however “open up a public space to grapple with past 
injustices” (Nesiah 2005: 283). Nevertheless “(…) a truth commission is not an adjudicator of 
truth, but merely a catalyst for that dialogue” (ibid). This dialogue is important insofar as it 
changes people‟s perceptions and attitudes towards each other. This is probably all that truth 
commissions hope to do: “(…) to help realise the public conditions which encourage these 
internal moral transformations” (Wilson 2001: 547). Based on these observations we suggest 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H.2.2.9: “A truth commission is more likely to contribute to reconciliation if it 
successfully pursues reconciliation strategies (such as creating an account of the past 
which is agreed upon to the extent that it (the past) no longer interferes with future 
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policy-making; and public hearings where victims and perpetrators can meet agree to 
some terms of reference for future co-existence).” 
 
